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Abstract—We examine the applicability of wireless indoor
quantum key distribution (QKD) in hybrid quantum-classical
networks. We propose practical configurations that would enable
wireless access to such networks. The proposed scenarios would
allow an indoor wireless user, equipped with a QKD-enabled
mobile device, to communicate securely with a remote party
on the other end of the access network. QKD signals, sent
through wireless indoor channels, are combined with classical
ones and sent over the same fiber link to the remote user. Dense
wavelength-division multiplexing would enable the simultaneous
transmission of quantum and classical signals over the same fiber.
We consider the adverse effects of the background noise induced
by Raman scattered light on the QKD receivers due to such an
integration. In addition, we consider the loss and the background
noise that arise from indoor environments. Decoy-state BB84 and
measurement-device-independent protocols are employed for the
secret key rate analysis.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution (QKD), BB84, decoy
states, measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), op-
tical wireless communications (OWC).
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant users,
Alice and Bob, to generate and share provably secure keys
guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics [1]. Experiments
have already shown the successful implementation of QKD
over optical fiber and free-space [2], [3]. QKD has also been
used for security assurance over core networks [4]–[6], in
addition of being commercially available [7]. Despite such an
outstanding progress, QKD has yet to offer more convenient
access to its networks, via wireless connections, before being
adopted by a large number of users. In our recent work [8], [9],
we have investigated the feasibility of realizing wireless QKD
in indoor environments. In this work, we extend our work by
adopting wireless indoor QKD in more realistic scenarios. In
particular, we look at different scenarios in which a wireless
QKD link can be embedded into a hybrid quantum-classical
access network. In such networks, quantum and classical
signals are transmitted over the same fiber link. This poses a
major challenge on the quantum channels due to the crosstalk
noise induced by data channels mainly because of the Raman
scattered light. In this paper, we propose three structures for
wireless-enabled hybrid access networks and compare their
performance in terms of the secret key generation rates that
they can offer.
Embedding QKD capability onto mobile devices is consid-
ered as an attractive solution for exchanging sensitive data in
a safe and convenient manner, particularly in indoor environ-
ments [10]. For instance, customers in a bank can exchange
secret keys wirelessly with access points in the branch without
waiting for a teller or a cash machine. However, the recipient
may be located at a farther distance in some other scenarios,
in which case networked connections are necessary. In the
latter case, we can embed the wireless QKD link into a larger
quantum-classical network. In this case, wireless QKD signals
must somehow be collected and sent to the service provider
over an optical fiber.
In order to have a cost effective solution, the collected wire-
less QKD signals should possibly be transmitted along with
classical signals over the same fiber links. A hybrid quantum-
classical network would, however, face certain challenges due
to the nonlinear effects in optical fiber, such as four-wave
mixing and Raman scattering [11]. The latter is regarded as the
dominant source of background noise in such a combination
[11]. The impact of the Raman scattered light can be severe,
because its spectrum can overlap with the frequency band of
QKD channels, and, accordingly, it would increase the error
probability at the QKD receivers. The impact of this noise can
be mitigated [12]–[14], and even maximally reduced [16], but
it cannot be fully suppressed. Our system would also confront
another challenge due to the background noise and loss in
indoor environments [8], [9].
In this paper, by considering the effect of various sources of
noise mentioned above, three scenarios of embedding wireless
indoor QKD links into quantum-classical access networks are
investigated. In each case, we find the corresponding key
generation rate for relevant QKD protocols. In particular,
we use the decoy-state BB84 [17] and measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [18] protocols in our setups.
The latter can provide a trust-free link between the wireless
user and the central office in an access network. The price to
pay, however, is the possible reduction in the rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec.
II, the system is described and in Sec. III the key rate analysis
is presented. The numerical results are discussed in Sec. IV
and Sec. V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe the proposed setups for a hybrid
quantum-classical network that includes an optical wireless
QKD link. Such a link can wirelessly connect a mobile
quantum user, in indoor environments, to the access network.
We assume a total of N end users, which are connected to
the central office via a dense wavelength-division multiplexing
(DWDM) optical access network. The corresponding wave-
lengths assigned to quantum and classical data channels are,
respectively, denoted by Q = {λq1 , λq2 , ...,λqN }, D = {λd1 ,
λd2 , ...,λdN }. User k = 1, . . . , N uses wavelength λqk (λdk )
to communicate his quantum (classical) signals to the central
office. The same wavelengths are also used for the downlink.
In order to heuristically reduce the Raman noise effect, we
assume that the lower wavelength grid is allocated to the QKD
channels, while the upper grid is assigned to data channels
[14].
The end user is connected to the access network via a
wireless link. Here, we focus on the quantum side of the story
and investigate how such an end user can exchange a secret
key with the central office. Three scenarios are proposed in this
work. In the first scenario, see Fig. 1, the secret key exchange
between Alice and Bob, at the central office, is accomplished
in two steps using the decoy-state BB84 protocol. A secret
key, K1, is generated between Alice and the Rx box in Fig. 1,
and independently, another key, K2, is exchanged between Tx
and the relevant Bob in the central office. The final secret
key is then obtained by XORing K1 and K2. Note that, in
this scenario, the two links are completely run separately,
and, therefore, the wavelength used in the wireless link does
not need to be the same as the wavelength used in the fiber
link. In fact, for the wireless link, we use 880 nm range of
wavelength, for which more efficient single-photon detectors
are available. In the second and third scenarios, we use the
MDI-QKD technique to directly interfere the quantum signal
sent by the users with that of the central office. This can be
accomplished by, if necessary, coupling the wireless signal
into the fiber, and performing a Bell-state measurement (BSM)
on the photons sent by Alice and Bob at either the user’s
end (scenario 2), or the service provider’s end (scenario 3)
as shown in Figs. 2 and 3. Scenarios 2 and 3 are of interest
whenever the indoor environment we are working at is not
trustworthy. For instance, if we are working at a public place,
such as a coffee shop or an airport, we may not necessarily
trust the owners of the local system. In such scenarios, MDI-
QKD provides us with a solution to exchange a key with the
service provider without trusting the local node. Scenario 1 is
applicable whenever such a trust exists. For instance, in home
networks, we can physically secure both Tx and Rx boxes,
hence secure the data communication between them.
We consider a particular indoor environment, in which it
has been shown that wireless QKD is feasible [8], [9]. We
consider a window-less room of X×Y×Z dimensions, which
is lit by an artificial light source. The possibly mobile QKD
transmitter is placed on the floor and it transmits light toward
Fig. 1. The first scenario, where secret key exchange between Alice and Bob
is achieved in two steps. K1 is generated between Alice and Rx, while K2
is generated between Tx and Bob. The resultant final key is computed by
taking the XOR of K1 and K2. Three cases are examined according to the
position of the QKD transmitter, as well as the alignment and directionality
of the light beam.
Fig. 2. The second scenario, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice
and Bob using the MDI-QKD protocol. The BSM is performed at the user’s
end in this scenario.
Fig. 3. The third scenario, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice
and Bob using again the MDI-QKD protocol. The QKD signals are collected
and coupled to the fiber and sent to Bob, where the BSM is performed.
the ceiling. The QKD receiver or the signal collector is fixed
at the center of the room’s ceiling. We in particular study
three different cases regarding the position of the mobile
QKD device. Case 1 refers to the scenario when the QKD
transmitter is placed at the center of the room’s floor, and
emits light upward with semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2. In
case 2, the same QKD transmitter as in case 1 is moved to
a corner of the room in order to assess the mobility features.
These cases represent optical wireless communications (OWC)
systems with minimal beam steering. In case 3, the light beam
is narrowed and is directed toward the QKD receiver or the
coupling element with semi-angle at half power of Θ1/2, so
the system performance is improved. Note that in scenarios
2 and 3, we need to interfere a single-mode signal traveling
in fiber with a photon that has traveled through the indoor
channel. In order to satisfy the indistinguishibility criterion,
we then need to collect only one spatial mode from the
wireless channel as well. That would necessitate the use of
some flexible beam steering for the telescope employed on
the ceiling. Here, we assume that in all three cases such a
telescope can be dynamically rotated to focus on the beam
of light coming from the QKD source. In practice, one can
alternatively use techniques reported in [15].
For our key-rate analysis, we need to estimate the loss and
background noise within the wireless indoor environment, as
well as through the optical fiber. With respect to the indoor
environment, the background noise induced by the artificial
lamp is calculated. The amount of background noise in the
room depends on the power spectral density (PSD) of the
employed light source. The receiver’s FOV is also important,
since it limits the amount of background noise that may sneak
into the QKD receiver. Here, we account for the reflected light
from the walls and the floor that would be collected at the
ceiling. We use OWC models for loss and background noise
to calculate relevant parameters. In this paper, we follow the
same methodology and assumptions, as presented in our recent
work in [8], [9], to calculate the indoor channel transmittance,
H(0), and the corresponding background noise. For the sake
of brevity, we do not repeat that analysis here. As for the
optical link, we make the following assumptions. We consider
a loss coefficient α in dB/km in the single-mode fiber. We
also assume that the loss contributed by each multi-port (with
more than two ports) DWDM multiplexer (labeled as AWG
(Arrayed Waveguide Grating) in Figs. 1–3) is Λ in dB. We
neglect the loss associated with two-to-one multiplexers. We
have an additional coupling loss in scenarios 2 and 3 because
we have to perform a BSM on photons traveling through
different environments. In these scenarios, we assume that the
wireless photon is coupled into a single-mode fiber, and will
interfere with the photon sent by the central office in a fiber-
based BSM module. In both scenarios, we consider a coupling
loss of ξ in dB. The implicit assumption here is that we collect
only a single spatial mode of the wireless photon. In order to
couple this photon efficiently to fiber then the effective FOV
at the collection point should match the acceptance angle of a
single-mode fiber. That requires us to use FOVs roughly below
6◦.
The main source of background noise on QKD channels in a
fiber link is Raman scattering. The Raman noise generated by a
strong classical signal spans over a wide range of frequencies,
hence can populate the QKD receivers with unwanted signals
[11]. Depending on the location of the QKD receiver, it may
be affected by forward and backward scattered light [16]. For a
classical signal with intensity I , at wavelength λd, the Raman
noise power at a QKD receiver with bandwidth ∆λ centered
at wavelength λq is given by [11] [12]
IfR(I, L, λd, λq) = Ie
−αLLΓ(λd, λq)∆λ, (1)
for forward scattering, and
IbR(I, L, λd, λq) = I
(1− e−2αL)
2α
Γ(λd, λq)∆λ, (2)
for backward scattering, where L is the fiber length, and
Γ(λd, λq) is the Raman cross section (per unit of fiber length
and bandwidth). The latter can be measured experimentally.
We have used here the results reported in [11] for λd =
1550 nm, and have used the prescription in [16] to adapt it to
any other wavelengths in the C band. The transmitted power
I is also set to secure a BER of no more than 10−9 for all
data channels.
III. KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, the secret key rate analysis for our proposed
setups is presented considering non-idealities in the system.
Without loss of generality, we only calculate the rate for user
1 assuming that polarization encoding is used. in practice, one
can use time-bin or phase encoding techniques, which better
suit our channel characteristics, and obtain similar results. The
decoy-state BB84 protocol [17] is used for the first scenario,
while the MDI-QKD protocol [18], [19] is employed for
scenarios 2 and 3.
A. Scenario 1 with Decoy-State BB84 protocol
The decoy-state protocol enables weak coherent laser pulses
to be used in QKD systems, while being robust against the
photon-number-splitting attack [20]. The lower bound for the
key generation rate, in the limit of an infinitely long key and
infinitely many decoy states, is given by [17]
R ≥ q{−Qµfh(Eµ) +Q1[1− h(e1)]}, (3)
where q is the basis-sift factor, which is assumed to approach 1
in the efficient BB84 protocol [21] as employed in this work;
the error correction inefficiency is denoted by f ; and µ is
the average number of photons per pulse for the signal state.
Moreover, in (5), Qµ, Eµ, Q1, e1, and h(x) are, respectively,
the overall gain, the quantum bit error rate (QBER), the single-
photon gain, the error rate in single-photon states, and the
Shannon binary entropy function, and they are given by [22]:
Qµ = 1− e−ηµ(1− nN )2, (4)
Eµ =
e0Qµ − (e0 − ed)(1− e−ηµ)(1− nN )
Qµ
, (5)
where e0 = 1/2 and ed is the misalignment probability;
Q1 = Y1µe
−µ, (6)
e1 =
e0Y1 − (e0 − ed)η(1− nN )
Y1
, (7)
where
Y1 = 1− (1− η)(1− nN )2 (8)
and
h(x) = −x log 2x− (1− x) log 2(1− x). (9)
In the above equations, η and nN are, respectively, the
total system transmittance and the total noise per detector.
As for nN , in the case of K1 in scenario 1, we assume
that the background noise due to the artificial lighting source
is denoted by nB1 . The latter has been calculated using the
methodology proposed in [8]. As a result, the total noise per
detector is nN =
1
2nB1ηd1 + ndc, where ηd1 is the detector
efficiency and ndc is the dark count rate per pulse for each
detector in the Rx box in Fig. 1. We neglect the impact of
the ambient noise in our windowless room [8]. As for K2, the
background noise is induced by the Raman scattered light. In
this scenario, forward scattered light is generated because of
the classical signals sent by the users, and backward scattered
light is due to the signals sent by the central office. The
total Raman noise power, at wavelength λq1 , for forward and
backward scattering are, respectively, given by
IfT1 = [I
f
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+
N∑
k=2
IfR(Ie
−αLk , L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10 (10)
and
IbT1 = [I
b
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+
N∑
k=2
IbR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10, (11)
where L0 is the total distance between the central office to the
AWG box on the users’ end, and Lk is the distance of the kth
user to the same AWG in the access network. In the above
equations, we have neglected the out-of-band Raman noise
that will be filtered by relevant multiplexers in our setup. The
total background noise per detector, at the Bob’s end in Fig. 1,
is then given by
nN =
ηd2λq1Td
2hc
(IfT1 + I
b
T1) + ndc, (12)
where ηd2 is the detector efficiency at the Bob’s receiver, Td
is the time gate duration, h is the Planck’s constant, and c is
the speed of light in vacuum.
Similarly, in order to calculate the total transmissivity η,
we use the following procedure. As for K1, η is given by
H(0)ηd1 , where H(0) is the path loss between Alice and Rx.
As for K2, η is given by ηchηd2 , where ηch is the optical
fiber channel transmittance including the loss associated with
AWGs, and it is given by 10−[α(L1+L0)+2Λ]/10.
B. Scenarios 2 and 3 with MDI-QKD
The MDI-QKD protocol provides an efficient method of
removing all detector side-channel attacks. This is done by
performing the measurement by a third party, Charlie, who
is not necessarily trusted. In this protocol, Charlie performs
a BSM on Alice and Bob’s states prepared in X or Z
basis. Then, he announces the measurement outcomes of the
successful events over a public channel. Alice and Bob will
also announce the bases used to encode the transmitted qubits.
The rest of the protocol is similar to the BB84 protocol [23]
in terms of sifting and privacy amplification procedures. We
employ the MDI-QKD protocol [18] in scenarios 2 and 3.
In the limit of infinitely long keys, the key generation
rate for an MDI-QKD protocol that uses ideal single-photon
sources and the one that uses the decoy-state protocol are,
respectively, lower bounded by
RMDI−QKD = Y11[1− h(e11:X)− fh(e11:Z)] (13)
and
RMDI−QKD = Q11(1− h(e11;X))− fQµν;Zh(Eµν;Z), (14)
where Y11 and Q11 are, respectively, the yield and the gain of
single-photon states given by [22]
Q11 = µνe
−µ−νY11, (15)
where µ (ν) is the mean number of photons in the signal state
sent by Alice (Bob), and
Y11 =(1− nN )2[ηaηb/2 + (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)nN
+ 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)n2N ], (16)
where ηa and ηb are, respectively, the total transmittance
between Alice and Bob sides and that of Charlie and nN
represents the total noise per detector. In (13) and (14), e11;Z ,
e11;X , Qµν;Z , and Eµν;Z , respectively, represent the QBER in
the Z basis for single-photon states, the phase error for single-
photon states, the overall gain, and the QBER in the Z-basis,
and they are given by [22]:
e11;XY11 = Y11/2− (0.5− ed)(1− nN )2ηaηb/2
e11;ZY11 = Y11/2− (0.5− ed)(1− nN )2(1− 2nN )ηaηb/2
Qµν;Z = QC +QE
Eµν;ZQµν;Z = edQc + (1− ed)QE ,
where
QC =2(1− nN )2e−µ
′
/2[1− (1− nN )e−ηaµ/2]
× [1− (1− nN )e−ηbν/2]
QE = 2nN (1− nN )2e−µ
′
/2[I0(2x)− (1− nN )e−µ
′
/2]
x =
√
ηaµηbν /2, µ
′
= ηaµ+ ηbν, (17)
where I0 is the modified Bessel function. In the above equa-
tions, ed models possible errors due to polarization distortion,
which make the arriving photons distinguishable at the BSM
module.
In the second and third scenarios, both Raman noise and
indoor-channel background noise are present. The forward and
backward scattered light is generated by the classical signals
of users and the central office. The total Raman noise power,
at wavelength λq1 , for forward, denoted by I
f
T3, and backward,
TABLE I
NOMINAL VALUES USED FOR OUR SYSTEM PARAMETERS.
Parameter Nominal value
Room size, X ,Y ,Z (4× 4× 3) m3
Φ1/2, Θ1/2 30
◦, 4◦
Average number of photons per signal pulse, µ = ν 0.5
Fiber attenuation coefficient, α 0.2 dB/km
Loss due to each AWG (Λ), Coupling loss (ξ) 2 dB, 3 dB
Error correction inefficiency, f 1.16
Number of users, N 32
Dark count rate, ndc 10
−7 ns−1
Time gate duration, Td 100 ps
Misalignment probability, ed 0.033
Quantum efficiency, ηd1, ηd2 0.6, 0.3
denoted by IbT3, scattering of scenario 3 are, respectively, given
by IfT1 and I
b
T1. For the second scenario, they are given by
IfT2 = [I
f
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+ e−αL1
N∑
k=2
IfR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10 (18)
and
IbT2 = [I
b
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1)
+ e−αL1
N∑
k=2
IbR(Ie
−αLk , L0, λdk , λq1)]10
−2Λ/10. (19)
As a result, considering the background noise from the wire-
less channel, the total noise per detector, nN , for scenario
s = 2, 3 is given by
nN =
1
4
[
ηd2λq1Td
hc
(
IfTs + I
b
Ts
)
+ ηd2nB1ηcs
]
+ ndc (20)
where ηc2 and ηc3 are, respectively, the loss in the cou-
pling element and the total loss that the indoor back-
ground photons, generated by the bulb, will undergo before
reaching the QKD receiver, and are given by 10−ξ/10 and
10−[α(L1+L0)+2Λ+ξ]/10.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical results for the
secret key generation rates in the three proposed scenarios.
We use a DWDM scheme with 100 GHz channel spacing in
the C-band with 32 users. We define Q = {1530.8 nm, 1531.6
nm,...,1555.62 nm} andD = {1560.4 nm, 1561.2 nm,...,1585.2
nm} for quantum and classical channels, respectively. We
assume that λq1 is 1555.62 nm and the corresponding λd1 is
1585.2 nm. The classical data is transmitted with launch power
I = 10(−3.85+αL/10+2Λ/10)mW, which corresponds to a
receiver sensitivity of -38.5 dBm guaranteeing a BER < 10−9.
In the three scenarios, we assume that L1 = L2 = · · · = LN
all equal to 500 m. We vary L0 to evaluate the rate versus
distance behavior. The nominal parameter values used in our
simulation are summarized in Table I.
In each scenario, three cases are considered for the light
beam orientation of the QKD source. In the first case, the
semi-angle at half power of the QKD source is Φ1/2 = 30
◦,
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Scenario:2 (MDI-QKD: Single-photon pulse)
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Fig. 4. Secret key generation rate versus L0+L1 in case 1, when the QKD
source is at the center of the room facing the QKD receiver, for scenarios 1
to 3.
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Scenario:2 (MDI-QKD: Single-photon pulse)
Scenario:3 (MDI-QKD: Single-photon pulse)
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Fig. 5. Secret key generation rate versus L0+L1 in case 2, when the QKD
source is at the corner of the room, but not fully aligned with the receiver,
for scenarios 1 to 3.
and the QKD source is placed at the center of the room’s
floor. With the same Φ1/2, the QKD source is moved to the
corner of the room in the second case. We use Θ1/2 = 4
◦
in the third case where the QKD source is located at the
corner of the room as in the second case, but the beam in
case 3 is directed and focused toward the QKD receiver or the
collection element. A full alignment is assumed in the third
case, while in the other two cases the QKD source is sending
light upward toward the ceiling with a wider beam angle.
We assume that at the receiver, the telescope is dynamically
rotated to collect the maximum power from the user in the
room. We assume that the effective receiver’s FOV would
correspond to the acceptance angle of a single-mode fiber.
Here, the QKD receiver’s FOV is assumed to be 6◦, which
roughly corresponds to a numerical aperture around 0.1.
Figure 4 shows the secret key generation rate in case 1 for
all three scenarios. In scenario 1, the key rate is given by the
minimum of the key rates for K1 and K2. That is why it is
constant up to a certain distance, at which point the rate for
K2 would specify the total key rate. It is clear that scenario 1
offers better key rates than scenarios 2 and 3. This is mainly
because, by using a relay point in the room, we deal with
the loss in the indoor channel and the fiber loss, separately,
whereas, in scenarios 2 and 3, we have to tolerate both sources
of loss in the MDI-QKD setup. The advantage for the latter
is, as mentioned earlier, in not being required to trust the relay
point at the local node. In order to obtain non-zero key rates
in scenarios 2 and 3, we have used a lower value of PSD, and
assumed ideal single-photon sources are used, as compared to
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Fig. 6. Secret key generation rate versus L0 +L1 in case 3, with full beam
alignment, for scenarios 1 to 3.
weak laser pulses. The same conclusion is held in case 2, as
shown in Fig. 5, but, here, we even need lower PSD values on
the order of 10−7 W/nm in order to achieve positive key rates.
One may conclude that under the weak alignment conditions in
cases 1 and 2, it may not be realistically practical to implement
a trust-free wireless QKD access network.
The situation is, however, much more optimistic if full
alignment between the wireless QKD receiver and transmitter
is attained. Figure 6 compares the three scenarios in case
3 when such a full alignment is held. It can be seen that
we can now achieve positive key rates in all three scenarios,
even if we use the decoy-state protocol, with PSD values on
the order of 10−5 W/nm, which correspond to white LED
sources. It is interesting to note that the choice between the
trust-free setups in scenarios 2 and 3 is driven by different
factors. In Fig. 6, it can be seen that while scenario 2 has a
better performance than scenario 3 for single-photon sources,
the opposite is the case if weak laser pulses are used at
the user’s source. This is associated with the relevance of
the background noise generated by the bulb in the room.
In scenario 2, this background noise will directly enter the
BSM module, whereas, in scenario 3, it will be attenuated
by the channel loss. It then turns out that for very low PSD
values, scenario 2 offers a better performance than the setup in
scenario 3. Once the PSD value grows, the opposite will be the
case. This switching point happens earlier for the decoy-state
system than the single-photon one, but it eventually happens
for the latter as well. It can also be seen that all setups offer
secure key exchange for up to tens of kilometers. This is
compatible with the typical range of distance in many passive
optical networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed and studied three configurations that would
enable wireless access to hybrid quantum-classical networks.
All these setups would include an initial wireless indoor link
that connects the quantum user to the network. Each user, in
the access network, could also communicate classically with
the central office via another wavelength in the same band. We
considered setups in which a local relay point could be trusted,
as well as scenarios that such a trust could not be held. We
showed that, with proper beam alignment, it would be possible
to achieve positive key rates in both cases in certain indoor
environments. The choice of the optimum setup would depend
on various system parameters. Our analysis could identify the
winner in realistic scenarios, where background noise from
the environment as well as the Raman noise in fiber were
both taken into account. This would enable high-rate wireless
access to future quantum networks. This research is partly
funded by the UK EPSRC Grant EP/M013472/1.
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